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the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), a variant of a negative income tax, and a wage subsidy program. Our 
intent is to set out the conventional theory of labor supply in an easily understood way, to show how this 
theory may be helpful in the examination of an issue of importance to public policy, and to survey the 
available empirical literature for reasonable estimates of the parameters necessary for implementation of 
the theory. 
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and verbalize the analysis often, and we will try to integrate various income maintenance schemes into 
the analysis to see what implications are provided regarding work (dis)incentives from them. There are 
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USING ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND 
SUBSTITUTION PARAMETERS TO PREDICT 
THE WORK INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS INCOME 
MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS: A BRIEF EXPOSITION AND PARTIAL 
SURVEY- OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
by 
Orley A s h e n f e l t e r 
and 
Ronald Ehrenberg 
The views expressed in th i s paper are those of the authors and do not 
represent an o f f i c i a l posi t ion of the U.S. Department of Labor, i t s 
agencies, or s ta f f . 
In this paper we have set down a moderately rigorous 
exposition of the use of conventional economic analysis for 
the purpose of estimating the work (dis)incentives resulting 
from the institution of various income maintenance schemes. 
Most of the analysis is couched in terms of simplified versions 
of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), a variant of a negative 
income tax, and a wage subsidy program. Our intent is to set 
out the conventional theory of labor supply in an easily under-
stood way, to show how this theory may be helpful in the 
examination of an issue of importance to public policy, and 
to survey the available empirical literature for reasonable 
estimates of the parameters necessary for implementation of 
the theory. 
What we will do in the sequel is perfectly conventional. 
The only wrinkles are that we will try to simplify and verbaliz 
the analysis often, and we will try to integrate various income 
maintenance schemes into the analysis to see what implications 
are provided regarding work (dis)incentives from them. There 
are accordingly three parts to the paper: Part I is a strictly 
verbal discussion of everything that follows. Part II is a 
more conventional discussion with some mathematics. Part III 
is a review of much of the empirical work currently available. 
Our discussion throughout draws heavily on two previous^ _^ -, 
MARTIN Y C ,',' 
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papers*. 
I. Verbal Discussion 
The theory of labor supply is based on the notion that 
a family is faced with a number of short run decisions re-
garding how to allocate the time that its members have 
available to it. (We will speak of families with only two 
members potentially able to perform work in the labor 
market, and we will call them the husband and the wife, 
but there is no reason why they need be related in this 
way nor why there cannot be more family members capable of 
work.) These decisions relate to the amount of time that 
each family member will take as leisure, and, since the 
total amount of time available to them is fixed by nature, 
how much time they will therefore work. It is important 
to recognize that the decisions we will analyze are of a 
short run nature. Thus, time spent in long run upgrading 
of skills is not a part of the analysis. 
Now it is assumed that the family chooses the amount of 
leisure of the husband, the amount of homework (or leisure) 
* 0. Ashenfelter, "Using Estimates of Income and Substitution 
Parameters to Predict the Work Incentives of the Negative In-
come Tax: A Brief Exposition and Partial Survey", Princeton 
University, mimeo, Nov. 1970. 
<*. Cain and H. Watts, "Toward a Summary and Synthesis of the 
Evidence", in G.Cain and H. Watts ed. Income Maintenance 
and Labor Supply: Econometric Studies (forthcoming) 
-3-
of the wife, and thus the amount of goods and services that 
it will purchase, so as to make the household as satisfied 
as possible given the constraints it faces. These constraints 
aside from the length of a day and thus the total amount of 
time that the household owns, are the net after-tax wage 
rates of both the husband and wife and the amount of un-
earned income available to the household. Notice that the 
wage rates may be thought of as prices. In particular, 
they are the prices of the husband's and wife's leisure. 
If the family wishes to "purchase" another hour of either 
persons' leisure, then it must forego a dollar amount in 
consumption goods equal to the wage per hour. Put another 
way, the household receives positive satisfaction from three 
types of goods: the husband's leisure, the wife's leisure, 
and purchased goods and services. Since the household can-
not have all that it wants of each, it must choose some 
combination of amounts of these three so as to make itself 
as satisfied as possible given the constraints under which 
it operates. 
Now suppose that we confront a "typical" family with 
wage rates for husband and wife and some amount of unearned 
income. The family will choose values for the husband's 
and wife's amounts of work effort so as to make itself as 
well off as possible* Given these values, the wage rates, 
and the amount of unearned family income, we can then de-
termine this family's total income. We suppose that the 
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family is now in equilibrium, doing the best that it can 
with the situation it faces. Let us proceed by changing 
the wage rate that the husband in this family faces and 
then asking what happens to the behavior of the family. 
Clearly the family will be out of equilibrium after the 
wage change, and it may take some time before it has changed 
its behavior to the best possible alternative under the new 
situation it faces. What changes in behavior will a change 
in the husband's wage initiate? In particular, what will 
happen to the amounts.of labor supplied by the husband and 
wife to the market? Suppose that the wage change is an 
increase. In general, this will have two different effects 
of opposite sign on the husband's work effort. On the one 
hand, the family now finds that each extra hour of work 
that the husband does will buy a larger amount of purchased 
goods and services. Naturally, this will cause a tendency 
to increase work effort. This is called the substitution 
effect in the jargon of economics because a wage increase 
tends to cause a substitution of work for leisure. In 
effect, the price of leisure goes up when the wage rate 
does and this causes the family to want to substitute 
purchased goods and services for the husband's leisure. 
On the other hand, at the same amount of work effort as 
the husband previously expended, the family will clearly 
have a higher family money income. Thus, a wage increase 
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tends to make the family able to purchase—even at the old 
amount of work effort for the husband—more of all goods, 
including the leisure time of both the husband and the wife. 
Thus, the wage increase to the husband is also like a wind-
fall gain to the family. Such gains are likely to cause 
both members of the family to want to retain more time for 
leisure (or non-market work) activities. Thus, a wage 
increase to the husband will cause the income of the family 
to be higher and thus a decrease in the work effort of all 
family members. This is known as the income effect of a 
wage change. Notice that income and substitution effects 
have opposite signs, and it is thus generally impossible 
to predict the net effect of a wage increase on work effort. 
It is worth pointing out that an increase in the unearned 
income of the family would have only an income effect on 
work effort because such an increase would not change the 
number of hours of work required to obtain the dollar amount 
necessary to purchase any particular amount of goods and 
services. Thus, an increase in unearned income would tend 
to make the family wealthier and hence would unambiguously 
decrease the amount of work effort expended by" husband and 
wife.* 
*We have ignored one other small, and we believe second-order, 
effect that an increase in the husband's wage would have on 
the wife's labor supply. In particular, it may be that the 
wife's and husband's leisure are either net substitutes or 
net complements. If they are net substitutes, then an in-
-6-
Given this framework for the analysis of the family's 
work-related behavior, we can analyze the impact of various 
income maintenance schemes. First what is the effect on that 
behavior which would result from the institution of FAP, or 
a similar type plan? The two key features of FAP are (for 
a given family size, etc.): (1) a minimum guaranteed income 
level for the family regardless of the amount of work done, 
and (2) a tax rate on earned income — in the absence of 
complications from the introduction of state supplements --
50 percent. There are three separate groups of families 
we must consider. First, there are those families who, at 
the present time of the institution of the FAP, earn more 
than the break-even level of income.** So long as we assume 
these families are well above the break-even, level, the 
institution of the FAP presumably will not affect their be-
havior. Second, their are those families below the break-
crease in the price of the husband's leisure (i.e., an increase 
in his wage) would tend to cause a substitution of the wife's 
leisure for the husband's, i.e. a decrease in the wife's work 
effort. For example, if the family has young children then 
the wife's and husband's leisure (non-market work) may be 
substitutable in caring for the children. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the husband's and wife's leisure 
are complements, an increase in the price of the husband's 
leisure will result in a decrease in the leisure time taken 
by the wife. For example, if the members of the family 
customarily engage in leisure activities together, the 
husband's and wife's leisure time might be complementary. 
As we note above, these effects are likely to be very small 
relative to those discussed in the text. 
** The level of income above which no payment is made to 
the family is the break-even level. 
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even level who are currently participating in a welfare scheme. 
The spirit of the FAP legislation is that, at their current 
level of work effort, these people will not be made monetarily 
worse off after the institution of the FAP. So long as this 
is true, and so long as the tax rate under the FAP is less 
than the (often implicit) tax rate that these families face 
under the current welfare system, the substitution effect 
will operate to increase the work effort of this group. This 
happens because a reduction in the tax rate is equivalent to 
an increase in the after-tax wage rate. Likewise, the income 
effect of the tax change will have a negative effect on work 
effort. On the other hand, if the minimum guaranteed income 
level does not change, then this part of the FAP will have 
no effect on work effort for this group. If the minimum 
guarantee declines, then this will have a. positive effect 
on work effort that may offset the negative income effects 
of the tax decline. In practice this group would be hard 
to handle in any model, and a realistic approach to their 
likely work behavior would require the untangling of state 
legislated implicit tax rates as well as information on the 
size of behaviorial parameters which simply is not known.* 
*However, see our discussion below of Hausman's (1970) work, 
which attempts to analyze the labor supply responses of 
AFDC recipients. 
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The third group of families we must consider in some 
detail are the so-called "working poor." These are families 
who do not currently receive assistance, but who would receive 
assistance under FAP. Clearly, the change in the tax rate 
they face (from the normal income tax rate to 50 percent) 
will have a substitution effect tending to reduce the labor 
supply of both husband and wife and an income effect tending 
in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the minimum 
guarantee, of say $1600, would have a negative income effect 
for both husband and wife that would tend to reduce their 
labor supplied. For this group, however, we can definitely 
predict a reduced work effort for both husband and wife. 
The reason is that the positive income effect of a tax in-
crease cannot be as great as the negative income effect of ; 
the minimum guarantee if the family is below the break-even 
level, which is true by hypothesis for this group. 
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that 
although we may predict that the net effect of the FAP pro*1 
visions on the work effort of the working poor will be negative, 
the size of this effect depends cruciably on the magnitude of 
the income and substitution effect parameters in the labor 
supply functions of the husband and wife. We now have an 
accumulating body of empirical research on precisely this 
subject. In our opinion a great deal of this research is 
poorly directed, and some of it tends to contradict the 
theoretical model on which it is based. It seems likely 
that—for reasons this is not the place to discuss*—this 
is due less to any inadequacy in the underlying theory of 
labor supply (as we have briefly outlined it above) than 
to an imprecise and poorly specified movement from theory 
to data, and vice versa. In any event/ although it is by 
no means a universal finding, quite a bit of this research 
suggests that both the income and substitution parameters 
are relatively small in magnitude for male heads of house-
holds. On the other hand, this same body of research 
generally suggests that both income and substitution para-
meters are much larger in magnitude for married females 
(with husband present). This suggests that the institution 
of FAP is likely to have a relatively small effect on the 
labor supplied by family heads, but may have a somewhat 
larger effect on the labor supplied by married women. 
A percentage, or absolute dollar amount, wage subsidy 
may be analyzed in virtually an identical manner. Typically, 
such programs can be thought of as increasing the after-tax 
wage which low-income workers face, without changing their 
nonlabor income. This wage increase leads to both a work 
increasing substitution effect and a work decreasing income 
*For critiques of the existing empirical literature, see 
Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973), Cain and Watts (1973), and 
Garfinkle (1973). 
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•: effect, with the net impact on labor supply being ambiguous. 
Clearly, however, a wage subsidy program would induce people 
who are not in the labor force initially to increase their 
work effort (since for these individuals, the income effect 
is zero). Furthermore, one can show (see Browning (1972)) 
that a wage subsidy program will always lead an individual 
i to work longer hours than a comparable negative income tax 
program which would yield him an equivalent total income 
level. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the 
individual's labor supply function is forward or "backward" 
bending. 
II. Formal Analytic Treatment 
In this section, we formally spell out the analytic 
framework, and indicate how it may be used to simulate the 
impact of several income maintenance schemes. 
The problem of the family is to choose X , consumption 
goods; X , the leisure of the husband; and X , the leisure 
2 3 
of the wife so as to maximize 
(1) U = U(X , X , x ) 
1
 2 3 
subject to the constraint 
(2) (T-X )P + (T-X )P + Y = X P 
2 2 3 3 i i ' 
where T = total time available to a person 
P = wage of husband 
2 
p = wage of wife 
3 
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Y = unearned income 
p
 = price of consumption goods 
W = T - X = time worked by husband 
2 2 
W = T - X = time worked by wife 
3 3 
(2) says that earned income plus unearned income has to equal 
expenditures on consumption goods. First order conditions for 
a maximum require that 
(3) U _
 AP = o i = 1,...,3 
i i 
and that (2) hold, where U, is the partial derivation 9U and 
1
 8X 
i 
A is the marginal utility of income (a lagrangean multiplier). 
Confronting the household in equilibrium as described by (2) 
and (3) with changes in P , p , p , and Y is equivalent to total 
1 2 3 
differentiation of the former with respect to these parameters. 
Assuming that dP = o (i*e., that the prices of consumption goods 
1 
do not differ as between households — which seems•reasonable for 
this application) one may solve the resulting system for the small 
displacements dX and dX as functions of dP , dP , dY, X and X 
1 2 2 3 1 2 
(where X indicates the equilibrium value of X). Since dX = dW 
1 1 
it is possible to rewrite the resulting equations as 
- 1 2 -
(4) dW = s dP + a (W dP + W dP +' dY) 
2 22 2 2 2 2 3 3 
(5) dW = S dP + a (w dP + W dP + dY) 
3 33 3 3 2 2 3 3 
The theory of labor supply tells us that S and S , the income 
22 33 
compensated substitution effects for husband and wife respectively, 
must be positive. The presumptive signs of the income coefficients 
a and a are negative. Note that cross-substitution effects have 
2 3 
been assumed to be zero. The term (W dP + W dP + dY) is essential-
2 2 3 3 
ly the change in family income that results from displacements in 
the wages of husband and/or wife and unearned income. The 
institution of a FAP-like plan results in displacements to P , 
2 
and P , and Y because of the tax on earnings and the minimum 
3 
guarandee level. If the after tax wages were initially P , and P , 
2 3 
and the tax rate changes by t, then dP = -tP and dP = tP . 
2 2 3 3 
Likewise, if the minimum guarantee level is R, then dY = R. We 
may substitute these values in (4) and (5) to get the work effort 
effects of a FAP-like plan on a family with income less than the 
break-even level: 
(4a) dW = S tP + a [-W tP - W tP + R] 
2 22 2 2 2 2 3 3 
(5a) dW = S tP + a [-W tP - W tP + R]. 
3 33 3 3 2 2 3 3 
Since a and a are presumably negative, both dW and dW will be 
2 3 2 3 
likewise so long as pre-FAP family income, FI = W P + W p ' 1 S ^esi 
2 2 3 3 
than R/t. [this inequality follows from the fact that tht the term 
in brackets in (4a) and 5a) is just -tFI + R. For this term to be 
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positive, and thus a time it to be negative, tFI must be less 
than R; i.e., FI less than R/t.) But this must be so because 
R/t is just the break-even income level and we are assuming 
that the family's pre-tax income level is below this point* 
For the review of the empirical work that follows it is 
useful to transform (4a) and £a) slightly by multiplying the 
substitution terms by W /W and W /W respectively and rearranging 
2 2 3 3 
terms to get 
(4b) dW = -(S 2 )tW + a [R-t(W P + W P + Y)] 
2 22w 2 2 2 2 3 3 
2 ."•-. '• - -
(5b) dW = " ( S 3
 ) t w + a [R_t(w P W P + Y)]. 
3 33w 3 3 2 2 3 3 
3 
The terms to the immediate right of the equalities are income 
compensated substitution "elasticities." Once we know these 
elasticities, we simply multiply them by a persons* wage and the 
increase in his tax rate to get the substitution component of 
the disincentive. Once we know a and a we simply multiply 
2 3 
them by the difference between the minimum guarantee level and 
the pre-FAP family income multiplied by the increase in the 
P w P W 
tax rate. Call the substitution elasticities, S 2/2 and S 3/3, 
22 33 
*It is worth observing that we are assuming that unearned income 
is essentially negligible for these families. If it were not 
then -t times its level would have to appear within the bracketed 
terms in (4a) and (5a). 
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c
 j c 
n and n We will shortly turn to a review of the evidence on 
2 3 
the values of n^ and n as well as a and a.. 
2 3 2 3 
These elasticities can best be used to analyze the impact 
of various wage subsidy schemes, if they are first transformed 
into slightly different form. From (4) and (5), the uncom-
pensated substitution effects (the slope of the labor supply 
curves) for husband and wife respectively are given by 
(6) aw2/3P2 = s ^ + a2w2 
(7) 3W /3P = s +.a-W. 
3 3 33 3 3 
Because the income and substitution effects of a wage change 
operate in opposite directions, in general the slopes of the 
labor supply curves may be either positive or negative. However', 
for those individual's initially not in the labor force (w = 0), 
J 
the slope must be positive. To obtain, the uncompensated sub-
stitution elasticities (nt m u ) we multiply both sides of (6) 
3 
by P /W and both sides of (7) by P /W 
2 2 3 3 
(8) n = ru + a P 
2 2 2 2 
u c _ 
(9) n = n_ . a P 
3 3 + 3 3 
Finally, it is convenient to express the last term on the 
right-hand sides of (8) and (9) in terms of income elasticities 
of labor supply (n^/ n v; . Observe that 
2 3 
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(10) a P = 3W . = 8W WP 
2 2 _2 ? _J_ _Y_ 2
 2 = nYf 
^
 2 9V w ~ 7 ~ 2 2 
2 
where f is the proportion of total family income earned by*the 
2 
husband. Consequently we can rewrite (8), and in an analogous 
manner (9) as 
(11) nu
 = nc + ny f 
2 2 2 2 
(12) nU
 = n
c
 + nY 
3 3
 3
 f3 
If we call the last term in (11) and (12) the total income 
elasticity, then the uncompensated substitution elasticity is 
simply the sum of the compensated substitution elasticity and 
the total income elasticity*. 
Now consider a wage subsidy program in which an individual's 
after-tax wage is increased by some fraction (a)of the difference 
between his (her) current wage (p) and a specified target wage 
(p*). The amount of the subsidy (s) which an individual receives 
is clearly conditional upon his (her) hours of work. 
*Most investigators empirically estimate 
a = 9W /9yn, where yn is nonlabor income, rather than a . In 
2 2 2 
these cases, one can show that 
(ll1) n
 u = n
C
 +
 nynfl f w h o ^ ^yn where n* is the elasticity of labor 
^ 2 2 2 
supply with respect to nonlabor income and f is the ratio of 
2 
the husband's earned income to the family's nonlabor income. 
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(13) S = a (P*-P) W for P< p* 
p2 P* 
= o 
This type of scheme has the effect of increasing the net 
after-tax wage which the individual faces by 8 percent. 
(14) « = (P+a(P*-P) - P)/P 
= a(P* - 1) 
P 
Consequently, the percentage change in labor supply induced 
by the subsidy can be calculated as 
(15) %AW = n a (P*/P ) - 1) 
2 2 l 
(16) %AW = nUa(P*/P3) - 1) • 
3 3 
Once again we note that to evaluate the (dis)incentive as-
pects of the various schemes requires us to have estimates of 
the compensated substitution elasticities (nc , nC), the income 
2 3 
coefficients (a and a ) and the uncompensated substitution 
elasticities (n uf n u). It is to a survey of the empirical 
2 3 
estimates of these variables that we now turn. 
II. Survey of the Empirical Evidence 
Our survey of the empirical evidence covers three areas. 
First, the sets of income and substitution parameters estimated 
from cross-section survey data for both married men and women. 
Second, an attempt to infer labor supply responses of AFDC 
recipients, again using survey data. Finally, a discussion 
-17-
of the limited implications that can be drawn from the mid-
experiment results from the New Jersey negative-income tax 
experiment. 
Table 1 contains estimates of income and substitution 
parameters for males derived from 13 separate studies, while 
Table 2 contains similar estimates for 7 studies for females. 
Table 3 lists in some detail, the data source for each study, 
the marital-status and age group of the sample, and crucially, 
the income and substitution variables which are treated as 
parameters in the empirical analysis. Note that the variables 
treated as parameters vary between studies, as does the functional 
form of the equation estimated. Furthermore, most elasticity 
estimates are calculated using the mean values of the variables. 
Since the exact sample utilized varies across studies, even when 
the same underlying survey is used (i.e. primarily the S.EO), it 
is not surprising that the estimates vary across studies. 
Most author's present numberous sets of parameter estimates, 
rather than a single estimate for each coefficient. Furthermore, 
due to the varying model specifications, in many cases a number 
of manipulations were required before it was possible to produce 
the summary estimates listed in tables 1 and 2. These estimates 
are based upon interpretations of what is implied by each study's 
results, made previously by Orley Ashenfelter (1970) and Glen 
Cain and Harold Watts (1973) and those made by Ronald Ehrenberg 
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in an attempt to fill in the "gaps" in the two previous surveys. 
In tables 1 and 2, the letters "A", "C" , and "E" indicate which 
individual(s) calculations are being used. It should not be 
inferred that any of the original authors would agree with 
these interpretations. Furthermore, Ashenfelter's and Cain 
and Watts' interpretations have been "filtered through" 
Ehrenberg, so he must bear full responsibilities for these 
tables. 
Turning first to table 1, the estimates of the income 
effect parameter (a ) for males lie primarily in the range -.2 
2 
to 0.0. Only Hill (-.40) and Kalachek and Raines (-.25) con-
sistently come up with larger (in absolute value) estimates. 
However, both of these studies confine themselves to samples 
of low-income households and, as shown by Cain and Watts, 
truncation of the sample to exclude observations with current 
incomes above a certain level is likely to result in a negative 
bias in the income coefficient.* Consequently, it seems likely 
that the "true" income effect parameters lies in the -.2 to 0.0 
range with perhaps -.15 to -.10 being a reasonable "best" es-
timate. 
* Detailed critiques of the methodologies used in the various 
studies are presented in Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973), Cain 
and Watts (1973) and Garfinkle (1973). Rather than attempting 
to repeat all their comments, we shall simply discuss those 
points which we believe relevant to the divergence in the 
estimates. 
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The estimates of the compensated substitution elasticity 
for male (nc) fall into two groups. Estimates by Kalachek 
2 
and Raines and Hill lie between .4 and 1.0, while all other 
estimates are below .4 with most in the 0.0 to 0.3 range. It 
is important to note (see table 3) that most studies do not 
estimate directly the compensated substitution term, Ashenfelter 
and Heckman being the sole exception, but rather infer it from (17) 
(17) n° = n u ~ a p (where P is the initial wage rate) 
2 2 2 
Consequently, if the income coefficient a is biased in a 
2 
negative direction, ceteris paribus, the compensated substitution 
elasticity will be biased in a positive direction. This clearly 
explains why Hill obtained larger values than the "concensus" 
for "nc ";note that his estimates of nu do not differ sub-
2 2 
stantially from those of most investigators. Kalachek and 
Raines' income coefficient is too close to the "concensus", 
however, to be able to explain a compensated substitution 
elasticity of close to 1.0. But other things are not equal, 
as their estimated uncompensated substitution elasticity of 
.55 to .65 is substantially larger than that found by any 
other investigator. Furthermore, the large elasticity is 
traceable to the responsiveness of the annual labor force 
participation decision to wages - a result which seems strange 
given the high participation rates of prime-age males. 
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Kalachek and Raines estimated a "potential wage" variable 
to use as a measure of expected earnings for non participants. 
However, as they themselves note, "Potential wages assigned 
to those outside the labor force may overstate their realistic 
earnings potential since non-labor force status leads to skill 
obsolescence and since the personally inadequate are more likely 
to be found without than within the labor force."* To the extent 
that nonparticipants earning potentials are overstated by their 
approach, it is easy to show that their estimated uncompensated 
substitution elasticity'is biased upwards. Consequently, as 
equation (17) indicates, their estimate of the compensated sub-'; 
stitution elasticity is also biased in a positive direction. 
It thus seems likely that a consensus estimate of the : 
compensated substitution elasticity should lie in the interval 
0.0 to 0.3.The range of the uncompensated substitution elasticity 
is more difficult to pin down, probably in the order of (-.3,-2). 
However, most of the evidence indicates that labor supply curves 
for males are backward bending over the relevant range. 
Turning to table 2, the/ substitution and income parameters 
for females are much less uniform in magnitude than the comparable 
male parameters. Several estimates (Parker, Telia et al-(a)) 
refer to the behavior of female heads of households, the re-
mainder refer to the behavior of wives. Except for Parker's 
* Kalachek and Raines (1970), p. 180 
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estimates, the income coefficients virtually all fall in the 
range(-.2 to 0.0). Parker's nonemployment income variable 
however included transfer payments which are conditional on 
the individual's not working. Consequently, his income effect 
parameter has a negative bias, it reflects a simultaneously 
determined "outside income" and hours decision rather than a 
causal relationship. It seems highly likely then that the 
income coefficient lies in the (-.2,0.0) range. 
On the other hand, the compensated substitution elasticity 
estimates seem to vary all over the place. Excluding Parker's 
estimates, which are inconsistent with the underlying theoretical 
structure, it seems unlikely that the elasticity is less than 
.3 and equally unlikely that it is greater than 1.3 for any 
large age or race groups.* Furthermore it is not clear that i 
we can differentiate the behavior of female heads from that 
of wives. While the range .3 to 1.3 is rather large, the 
"true" value clearly lies above the comparable value for 
males. Note also that the range of variation of the un-
compensated substitution elasticity varies between (-.7 and .9). 
c 
*Hall infers the value of S (and hence n ) from (18) S 
33 3 33 
8W /9P - a w . However, he assumes that W = 2000. Since the 
J 3
 3 3 3 
average women works less that 2,000 hours per year (indeed less 
than 1500), his estimates of S and hence n c are probably 
33 3 
biased up. 
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This range is sufficiently large to render any attempt to 
predict the impact of a wage subsidy scheme on work-effort 
of females as being virtually meaningless. 
In sum our knowledge of the quantitative magnitude 
of the income and substitution parameters for males, based 
upon cross-section econometric studies, seems much more 
precise than our knowledge about the comparable parameters 
for females. Thus, while we should be able to obtain 
meaningful estimates of the (dis)incentive effects of 
various income maintenance schemes for males, it is un-
likely that we will be able to obtain meaningful estimates > 
for females. This statement should be qualified however, 
by our noting that we may still be able to rank programs
 : 
on the basis of their relative incentive effects even if 
we can make no precise statements about the absolute effects. 
Our knowledge of the income and substitution parameters 
for AFDC recipients is even more sketchy. Although, a number 
of cross-section econometric studies based upon survey data 
have been recently conducted, to date we have seen only the 
study by Hausman (1970), and hence we focus our attention 
here on it.* 
* Recent cross-section econometric studies include D. Rowlatt 
(1971), D. Saks (1971) and B. Williams. Studies have also 
been conducted by G. Appell (19 72) and National Analysts 
Inc. (1971). However, the methodologies employed in the 
latter two studies do not permit us to infer anything about 
income and substitution parameters. 
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Hausman analyzed the labor force behavior of 2 40 0 AFDC 
recipiants in Alabama, Kentucky and Mississippi based upon 
a survey conducted in later 19 67 by the Social and Rehabilita-
tion Service division of HEW. These states were the only ones 
not to have 100% marginal tax rates on recipiants earnings in 
1967. Since he lacked wage rate data, Hausman was forced to 
use education levels as proxies for potential earnings. For 
purposes of discussion his model can be represented as, 
(18) L = a + a,y + a0t + a0 X + e o 1 J I 3 
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where* 
L - (0,1) variable to indicate current labor force 
status 
y - nonlabor income 
t - the implicit marginal tax rate on earnings-in-
cluding the loss of food-stamps 
x - all other variables including education 
e - a random error term 
Now suppose in fact, that the potential market wage 
(w*) that each AFDC recipient faces is actually independent 
of his(her) education level. Let the true labor supply 
function be given by 
(19) L = b o + b y + b
 w*(l-t) + b x + e* 
1 2 3 
If the potential market wage is in fact uncorrelated with 
the independent variables (x) we can decompose the potential 
wage into its mean value in the sample (w) and a random term 
(6 ) . Substituting into (19) 
(20) L = bo + b
 y +b (w+fi) (1-t) + b x + E* 
1 2 3 
or 
*Actually Hausman uses a vector of variables rather than a 
single nonlabor income variable. He also experiments with 
a dependent variable that takes on the value 1 (employed 
full-time), 1/2 (employed part-time or unemployed) and o 
(not in labor force). For well known reasons, this latter 
treatment is not satisfactory. 
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(201) L = (bQ + b2W) + bxY - (b2w)t + b X + e 
where e = e + b 6 - b Wt 
Observe that (20') is of the same form as (18) which 
Hausman estimates. Furthermore, it is clear that a-i will 
be an estimate of b, and a an estimate of -b^W. However, 
from (20') we see that the marginal tax rate is negatively 
correlated with the residual (e)• Consequently, his 
estimate of a_ will be biased in a negative direction 
and his estimate of b2 in a positive direction. 
Given our assumptions, it is easy to show that 
(21a) /BY = a -., • income coefficient 
,^ ,-x 9L,.rT W a2 W(l-t) - a2(i-t)* Uncompensated, sub-(21b) /3W
 E = — ZT — = — stitution effect 
W L L (nu) 
and 
(21c) n = n - lW(l-t) income compensated 
substitution effect 
Substituting Hausman's estimates of al and a2 from 
his Table 3 and utilizing the mean values of t and L in 
the sample, we find that the income coefficient lies in 
the range - .18 to - .14. That is, a fifty dollar increase 
in nonlabor income per month would reduce the AFDC recipie nt's 
probability of being in the labor force by 7 to 9 percent. 
* Here W refers to the individual^ after-tax net wage rate. 
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Similarly, the uncompensated substitution elasticity 
appears to be about .18.* Finally, the income compensated 
** 
substitution elasticity is approximately equal to 
(21C1) n° = .18 + .064W 
Assuming a mean hourly wage of $1.50 an hour would 
then yield a compensated substitution elasticity in the 
order of .30. All of these parameters fall within the 
ranges of the estimates for females presented in Table 2. 
We should emphasize that these estimates are based 
upon our interpretation of Hausman's work and require us to 
assure that potential wages are uncorrelated with educa-
tion levels.***, **** Furthermore, given the wide 
variability of the results in Table 2, these estimates 
should be considered distinctly tentative until they can 
be compared with the results for AFDC recipients obtained 
from other studiesK 
Finally, limited information on the labor supply 
responses of the low-income population can be obtained 
from the mid-experiment report of the New Jersey Income 
However, recall that this estimate is likely to be 
biased in a positive direction. 
Based upon (1-t) ^ -.4 al - - .16 
For low-income households this may not be a bad 
assumption, as estimates of rates of return to 
education are often insignificant. See, for 
example, Bennett Harrison (19 73). 
**** Hausman interprets results as indicating an income 
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Maintenance experiment (Watts (1971)). An analysis of the 
first year's data indicated that there was no significant 
earnings change differential between the control and 
noncontrol groups (the latter containing those families 
receiving benefits and facing marginal tax rates). How-
ever, this result can be decomposed into two parts. First, 
the control group works about 12 percent longer hours per 
family. Second, the experimental group's wages now 
appear to be about 10 percent higher. Apparently then the 
"lump-sum" guarantee has been used to subsidize search 
for better paying jobs. 
Unfortunately,, at the time the mid-experiment report 
was prepared, Watts was unable to ascertain any significant 
variations in labor supply across treatment groups 
(varying according to marginal tax rate faced and income 
guarantee). However, this does not imply that the results 
of the experiment suggest only small insignificant income 
and substitution parameters. Rather, simply that fet the 
time the mid-experiment report was prepared, for various 
reasons, nothing could be inferred. Hopefully, the final 
results that will be-available shortly will present more 
definitive results and can be incorporated into later 
drafts of this survey. 
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Summary 
This paper has presented a brief exposition of the 
use of income and substitution parameters in estimating 
the impact of various income maintenance programs on 
work incentives. After outlining the underlying theory 
and discussing (as illustrations) two proposed plans, 
we attempted to survey the existing empirical estimates 
* 
of these parameters. 
We are confident that estimates of the income and 
substitution parameters for males can be specified to 
lie in narrow ranges. However, for married females, 
female heads of households, and AFDC recepients our evi-
dence is tentative and imprecise. This suggests that 
we should be much more confident of our ability to 
predict the absolute (dis)incentive impacts of a pro-
posed scheme on males than on females. 
On the other hand, we should note that it is often 
possible to predict the relative impacts of several 
competing programs without knowing the quantitative 
estimates of the income and substitution parameters 
(e.g. Browning (1973)). Consequently, our ability 
to predict the relative impacts on females may not be 
impaired too seriously. 
* While we attempted to conduct a comprehensive survey, 
accessibility and time constraints prevented our con-
sidering the works of Christensen (1972), Leuthold (1968), 
Rea(1971), Rowlett (1971 ),Saks(1971), Williams, and 
undoubtedly others. Furthermore, as indicated above, 
later information from the "New Jersey Experiment" 
should be shortly available. 
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ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION 
PARAMETERS FOR FEMALES 
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Data Sources and Parameters 
Assumed Constant 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Sources and Parameters 
Assumed Constant 
Marital 
Status 
Age-Group 
LFP rates by 
SMSA married 
women 
married 
females 
Wives 21-59 
SEO - 1967 Wives 21-59 
CPS- 1966 Females 21-64 
low income 
* 
Parameters 
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3L 
3Y 
3H 
3YY 
Y 
3H 
3Y 
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L 9 L 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Data Sources and Parameters 
Assumed Constant 
rs 
ii-Welch 
,a, Telia 
Data 
Source 
SEO-1967 
1/1000 
Census 1960 
SEO - 1967 
Marital 
Status 
Age-Group 
Parameters 
Assumed Constant 
Males with children 3_H 3H (sometime 
a),b) below poverty line 3Y 3W linear) 
c),d) above poverty line 
Employed husbands 25-65 3_H 3_H {quadratic 
income 10,000 3Y 3W 
Male Heads 18-64 
wages $3.00 hr. 
Hours 
Labor force p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e 
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